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Purpose: In this study, we examine whether CEO pay-performance sensitivity to shareholder 
wealth is related to the use of non-financial performance measures in incentive contracts.  
Methodology: Using hand-collected performance measure data in a sample of S&P 500 firms 
across the period 1994-2010, we investigate the contemporaneous sensitivity of CEO bonus and 
cash pay to shareholder wealth of firms that employ non-financial performance measures of 
varying types and contractual weights in their bonus contracts along with financial measures 
(NFPM firms) in comparison to that of firms employing financial measures only (FPM firms).  
Findings: We find evidence that the pay-performance sensitivity is stronger in NFPM firms than 
in FPM firms. These results are driven by the use of CEO individual goals and operational 
efficiency. Furthermore, when using environmental, social and governance factors (ESG), the pay-
performance sensitivity is stronger in terms of accounting performance only. We also find that 
using non-financial performance measures enhances pay-performance sensitivity more as their 
contractual weights increase and as financial risk increases.  
Practical implications: These findings are important to stakeholders, and especially regulators in 
understanding incentive effects of alternative performance measures. We also shed light on what 
types of non-financial measures are better in helping firms align CEOs’ incentives to shareholders’ 
interests.  
Originality: Our study contributes to prior research on benefits of non-financial information 
within the context of executive compensation. We present original results about the effects of 
contractual weights of non-financial measures and financial risk on CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity. We also present new insights regarding how different types of non-financial measures 
affect CEO pay-performance sensitivity.  
Keywords: Non-financial performance measures; Pay-performance sensitivity; CEO bonus pay; 
Shareholder wealth 
 





Non-financial Performance Measures and Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
1. Introduction 
Executive compensation in the form of an annual bonus is usually contingent on meeting 
certain performance measures, which can be either financial or non-financial. Paying a bonus 
solely based on financial accounting performance has been criticized for encouraging myopic 
managerial behavior (Bushman et al., 1996). In addition, there has been a concern that executives 
are overpaid without supporting contemporaneous performance, what is known as ‘pay without 
performance’ (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Cohen et al., 2013). Non-financial performance measures 
(hereafter, NFPM) are often considered to be forward-looking and more effective in improving 
future performance than financial measures (hereafter, FPM) (Eccles, 1991; Ittner & Larcker, 
1998; Behn & Riley, 1999; Banker et al., 2000; Said et al., 2003; Dikolli & Sedatole, 2007).1 
NFPMs are also considered to improve the congruity between overall performance of a firm and 
shareholder wealth (Said et al. 2003). Including NFPMs in bonus contracts also complements 
equity-based compensation (Gan et al., 2020). 
In the current study, we investigate whether using NFPMs of different types and 
contractual weights in CEO incentive contracts affects CEO pay sensitivity to shareholder wealth 
differently. We use hand-collected data from annual proxy statements of a sample of S&P 500 
firms over the period of 1994-2010. In our first hypothesis, we expect and find that NFPM firms 
have a significantly higher pay-performance sensitivity than FPM firms, consistent with Cho et al. 
(2019). We further classify NFPMs into four categories: (1) strategic factors, (2) individual goals, 
(3) operational efficiency, and (4) environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors.2 We run 
 
1  Consistently, Bubbe (2007) theoretically shows that the contractible non-financial measures in the balanced 
scorecard can increase overall performance measures’ congruity and help better align the interests of shareholders and 
employees.    
2 The strategic factor group includes measures to evaluate the results of strategic initiatives such as firm growth, 




the tests of pay sensitivity to shareholder wealth for the four types of non-financial measures. Our 
results show that the improvement in pay-performance sensitivity due to NFPMs is driven by the 
measures related to individual goals and operational efficiency. We also find that while the use of 
ESG measures does not render a significant benefit of improving CEO pay sensitivity to 
shareholder wealth, it improves pay sensitivity to accounting performance.3  
In our second hypothesis, we test whether the positive impact of NFPMs on pay-
performance sensitivity increases as their contractual weight increases. We find that greater 
weights on NFPMs have a stronger positive impact of enhancing CEO pay sensitivity to 
shareholder wealth. In our third hypothesis, we investigate the impact of financial risk on the 
positive effect of NFPMs on pay-performance sensitivity. We find a significantly greater 
improvement in CEO pay sensitivity to shareholder wealth for NFPM firms than FPM firms as 
financial risk increases. Our results remain unchanged qualitatively in robustness tests controlling 
for endogeneity, survivorship bias and industry-peer firm performance.  
We add to the literature on the importance of non-financial information in an alternative 
context, namely incentive contracts (e.g. Amir & Lev, 1996, Banker et al., 2000; Hirschey et al., 
2001). In particular, we contribute to the literature in three important ways by utilizing the unique 
dataset (manually collected) of types and contractual weights of non-financial measures. First, we 
provide evidence that firms use non-financial measures in incentive contracts in such a way that 
enhances pay-performance sensitivity, consistent with prior studies (e.g. Schaefer, 1998; 
Gryglewicz et al., 2019; Cho et al. 2019; Göx & Hemmer, 2020). More importantly, we present 
 
leadership, succession planning and CEO-specific individual goals. The operational efficiency group includes 
measures to evaluate manufacturing efficiency or cost reduction. The ESG factor group includes measures to evaluate 
performance for environmental awareness, adherence to governance and ethical standards, other stakeholder factors 
(e.g. customer and employee-related), diversity, or quality control. 
3 This result is consistent with prior studies reporting that ESG measures improve accounting performance (Dahlmann 




evidence that non-financial measures for CEO individual goals and operational efficiency are the 
main drivers of the positive impact on pay-performance sensitivity. Our findings are especially 
important in the current environment where demand for more disclosure of non-financial 
information such as environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors is ever increasing (Amel-
Zadeh & Serafeim, 2018). This also ties into the increased interest in alternative performance 
measures such as measures of environmental awareness or corporate social responsibility 
performance (McGuire et al., 1988; Lee et al., 2013). Our results show that ESG measures improve 
pay sensitivity to accounting measures but not to shareholder wealth. Second, we report that 
contractual weights placed on non-financial measures are positively related to their benefit of 
improving pay-performance sensitivity. Third, we contribute to the literature on managerial 
incentives by addressing how the focus of such incentives shifts among incentivized performance 
measures in response to different financial risk levels faced by firms (e.g. Coles et al., 2006). 
Overall, our findings are important to all stakeholders who are concerned with shareholder wealth 
maximization including shareholders, regulators, and compensation committee members.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature and 
hypotheses development. Section 3 presents the sample selection process and the research design. 
Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 provides the discussion of our robustness tests and section 
6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Literature review  
Agency theory has long advocated that CEO compensation should be linked to firm 
performance to align CEO and shareholder interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, CEOs 




also conjecture and find a positive pay-performance relationship. However, they find the direction 
is the opposite, where higher CEO pay leads to higher firm performance. Datar et al. (2001) suggest 
that pay-performance sensitivity may decrease if there is high risk. That is, an optimal contract 
may sacrifice the congruity between overall firm performance linked to an agent’s compensation 
and shareholder wealth in order to reduce the riskiness of the agent’s compensation (and thus 
reduce risk premium). Furthermore, Gryglewicz et al. (2019) advocate that the incentives 
embedded in the compensation contract are important in driving performance.4  
Performance measures used for incentive pay include FPMs (such as earnings) and/or 
NFPMs (such as quality, customer satisfaction, or strategic factors). NFPMs, if employed in annual 
incentive plans, are usually used in conjunction with FPMs. Those firms which choose to use 
NFPMs in addition to FPMs tend to use them in the short-term or annual incentive plans, i.e., 
bonus pay. The long-term incentive pay is typically in the form of stock options or stock grants 
that are often based on accounting and/or stock return performance over the past several years. 
NFPMs are rarely used in long-term incentive plans (Ibrahim & Lloyd 2011). 
 
2.2 Hypotheses development 
Sliwka (2002) shows, using an analytical model, that incentive compensation based on 
financial results only will not effectively reward managers’ past performance, since strategic 
outcomes are realized in the future. He suggests that this can be mitigated by including NFPMs in 
the compensation contract. Davila and Venkatachalam (2004) find that including NFPMs in CEO 
compensation is expected to provide incremental information about CEOs’ actions over financial 
measures. 
 
4 Gryglewicz et al. (2019) find that increasing the intensity of growth option in compensation contracts can lead to 




We argue that the use of NFPMs in incentive compensation improves congruity of 
aggregate firm performance with shareholder wealth for several reasons. First, non-financial 
measures are forward-looking (Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Behn & Riley, 1999; Banker et al., 2000; 
Banker & Mashruwala, 2007; Dikolli & Sedatole, 2007) and thus including these measures in 
compensation contracts improves future financial performance (Eccles, 1991; Banker et al., 2000; 
Said et al., 2003). For example, Said et al. (2003) show that firms that employ a combination of 
FPMs and NFPMs have significantly higher current and future market returns than those using 
only FPMs.  
Second, the use of non-financial measures leads to improvements in current financial 
performance, consistent with the notion that non-financial measures tend to be complements of 
financial measures (Ittner & Larcker, 1995; Chenhall, 1997; Behn & Riley, 1999; Banker et al., 
2000; Said et al., 2003; Hoque, 2005; Bisbe & Malagueño, 2012).  
Third, results of non-financial measures are available more promptly for evaluation and are 
less susceptible to manipulation than financial measures (Rees & Sutcliffe, 1994; Barua et al., 
1995).  
Fourth, non-financial measures discourage earnings manipulation (HassabElnaby et al., 
2010; Ibrahim & Lloyd, 2011; Koubaa et al., 2013; Tahir et al., 2019).  
Based on the above discussion, including forward-looking NFPMs in annual bonus 
compensation contracts can better align managers and shareholders’ interests. Cho et al. (2019) 
confirm this and find that the choice of performance measures in the CEO bonus contracts has a 
significant impact on pay-performance sensitivity in the UK context. In addition,  Gan et al. (2020) 
find that including NFPMs in bonus contracts is positively associated with the relative importance 




effective in aligning managerial efforts with firms’ long-term value when firms include NFPMs in 
CEO bonus contracts. Therefore, our first hypothesis expects a stronger CEO pay sensitivity to 
shareholder wealth for NFPM firms than for FPM firms as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: NFPM firms have a stronger contemporaneous association between CEO 
pay and shareholder wealth than FPM firms and this relationship varies with different types of 
non-financial measures. 
Importantly, we expect that it is unlikely that different types of NFPMs work uniformly, 
given the variety of NFPMs that are used in CEO pay. For example, prior studies report that the 
use of ‘Environmental, Social and Governance’ (ESG) or customer satisfaction measures improves 
environmental or accounting performance (Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Van Beurden & Gössling, 
2008; Dahlmann et al., 2017; Golovkova et al., 2019).5 However, it is an empirical issue which 
types of NFPMs perform better than others. 
In the second hypothesis, we investigate whether the relative contractual weights of 
NFPMs in incentive contracts systematically affect the impact on pay sensitivity to shareholder 
wealth. According to agency theory, the principal would determine contractual weights of non-
financial measures based on the business strategies and the perceived benefit of these measures 
compared to the related costs (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Feltham & Xie, 1994; Datar et al., 
2001; Dikolli et al., 2009). As the principal values the forward-looking nature of non-financial 
measures as complements to financial efforts more, she would increase the weight on the non-
financial measures in incentive contracts. Therefore, we expect that placing a higher weight on 
NFPMs would increase congruity to a greater extent. Thus, pay-performance sensitivity and the 
 




benefit of using NFPMs would be enhanced if firms use them more extensively with higher 
weights. Accordingly, we state our second hypothesis, as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: NFPM firms have a stronger contemporaneous association between CEO 
pay and shareholder wealth than FPM firms when the contractual weights placed on non-financial 
measures are higher. 
 Holmstrom (1979) argues that efficient compensation contracts trade off the cost of 
compensating the agent for bearing risk with the benefit of extracting more effort from the agent. 
Consistently, Dai et al. (2014) report a negative relationship between risk and incentives. If firms 
have high financial risk, inducing CEO efforts for financial performance is more costly due to 
financial uncertainty and the resulting financial information is relatively noisier (Lambert & 
Larcker, 1987; Banker & Datar, 1989; Datar et al., 2001).6 Therefore, if financial risk is high, the 
principal is more inclined to focus on non-financial measures to avoid noise in financial measures. 
If high financial risk motivates CEOs to focus on short-term goals due to increased uncertainty 
and increased relative noise in financial measures, incentivizing CEOs to work on long-term 
oriented NFPMs would have a more positive impact on shareholder wealth. Risk considerations 
NFPM a valuable tool to enhance congruity (Budde, 2007). Thus, we expect that using NFPMs 
would lead to greater pay-performance sensitivity when financial risks are higher and our third 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: NFPM firms have a stronger contemporaneous association between CEO 
pay and shareholder wealth than FPM firms when financial risk levels are higher. 
 
 
6 Banker and Datar (1989) theoretically show that the relative weights on performance measures are negatively related 
to their relative noise. Lambert and Larcker (1987) empirically investigate the negative relationship between relative 




3. Sample selection and research design  
3.1 Sample selection 
Our sample consists of all firms in the S&P 500 index as of December 31, 2004. We collect 
performance measure information from the proxy statements (DEF14A) for our sample for the 
years 1994-2010. The S&P 500 firms are frequently used in compensation studies since they are 
larger firms with readily available compensation data (Byrd et al., 1998; Morgan & Poulsen, 2001; 
Vieito et al., 2008; Ibrahim & Lloyd, 2011; Kurt & Feng, 2019). We manually collect executive 
performance evaluation variables – the use of non-financial performance measures (NFPM), 
minimum financial thresholds for bonus payment (MINFIN), contractual weights, and types of 
non-financial measures - from the ‘Executive Compensation’ section of the proxy statements filed 
with the SEC. We obtain stock returns, stock price, and market value of equity from CRSP and 
use Compustat to collect financial variables such as return on assets (ROA) and total assets. We 
collect executive pay variables such as bonus and salary from ExecuComp. 
The selection criteria for the final sample are presented in Table 1. We begin with 6,080 
observations of S&P 500 firms over the period 1994-2010. These exclude firms in the financial 
and utilities industries since their regulatory environment differs from other industries. We delete 
841 observations where annual reports cannot be located due to reasons such as mergers and 
acquisitions, bankruptcy, etc. We also delete observations of firms whose CEOs do not participate 
in incentive plans or with missing information about performance measures We delete 
observations with missing data on Compustat, CRSP and ExecuComp. Finally, we delete 551 
observations in which the CEO in the current year is not the same as that in the prior year to control 
for biases from contractual changes due to CEO change (Leone et al., 2006; Shaw and Zhang, 




variables, following prior studies (Brick et al., 2012). The final sample consists of 3,933 firm-year 
observations of 327 firms in the years from 1994 to 2010. Of these firm-year observations, 1,483 
observations (38 percent) are from 207 NFPM firms and the remaining 2,450 observations are 
from 263 FPM firms.7  
 ((Table 1)) 
To further test the effect of NFPMs on the pay-performance relationship, we classify non-
financial measures used in our sample into four groups: (1) strategic factors; (2) individual goals; 
(3) operational efficiency; and (4) ESG. The first group, strategic factors, includes measures 
specifically designed to evaluate the results of strategic initiatives such as firm growth, business 
integration, product development and others. Measures of individual goals include those to 
evaluate CEO leadership, succession planning and CEO-specific individual achievements. The 
third group of operational efficiency includes measures to assess manufacturing efficiency and 
cost reduction. The last group of ESG refers to performance evaluation for environmental, 
adherence to governance and ethical standards, other stakeholder factors (e.g., customer and 
employee-related), diversity, or quality control. We find that out of the 1,483 firm-year 
observations of NFPM firms, 680 observations (46 percent) belong to the strategic factors group, 
721 observations (49 percent) to the individual goal group, 172 observations (12 percent) to the 
operational efficiency group and 585 observations (39 percent) to the ESG group.8   
3.2 Research design 
Hypothesis 1 examines pay-performance sensitivity in NFPM firms compared to FPM 
firms and effects of different types of non-financial measures on the result. We begin by testing 
 
7 The total number of firms in the NFPM and FPM sample exceeds the number of firms in the full sample as there are 
firms that are included in the NFPM sample for some years and the FPM sample in other years.   




Hypothesis 1 with the following pay-performance sensitivity model following Jensen & Murphy 
(1990), for NFPM and FPM firms, separately: 
𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐴𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐻𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽5𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 +
𝛽6𝐶𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐻𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽8𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐻𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑃 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘 + ∑ 𝐹𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀,   (1) 
 
where CHPAY = changes in CEO pay, either CHBONUS or CHCASH; from 
ExecuComp [in Thousands of Dollars]; 9 
 CHBONUS = changes in CEO’s bonus from the prior year to the current year; from 
ExecuComp [in Thousands of Dollars];  
 CHCASH = changes in CEO’s cash pay (salary and bonus) from the prior year to 
the current year; from ExecuComp [in Thousands of Dollars]; 
 TSR = total shareholder returns, measured as annualized returns multiplied by 
the beginning market value of equity (closing price multiplied by 
common shares outstanding); from CRSP [in Millions of Dollars]; 
 CHROA = changes in return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary 
items divided by total assets at beginning of year multiplied by 100, 
both from Compustat;  
 ε = an error term. 
  
All remaining variables are defined in the appendix. We suppress firm and time subscripts 
for simplicity. We estimate the model in Equation (1) for NFPM firms with NFPM=1 and FPM 
firms with NFPM=0 separately using a generalized linear model. Prior studies combine base salary 
and bonus to investigate the impact of performance evaluation measures on incentive pay. Thus, 
we use changes in cash paid for salary and bonus (CHCASH) and bonus pay (CHBONUS) as our 
dependent variables. While salary often gets adjusted upward if firm performance improves 
significantly, non-financial measures are used specifically for incentive contracts. Banker et al. 
(2013) emphasize that it is important to separate bonus from salary in compensation research 
because they have different dynamics of engaging the managers. Therefore, we use bonus pay 
(CHBONUS) as our main dependent variable. We focus on bonus and cash pay given that non-
 





financial measures are used in annual incentive plans and rarely used in equity incentive plans 
(Ibrahim and Lloyd, 2011).  
We examine whether the coefficients of TSR are significantly positive for both firm groups. 
We follow prior research and include other control variables (Controls, hereafter) that are 
potentially correlated with our dependent variables. We control for lagged accounting performance 
(Lag CHROA) since compensation in any year is directly influenced by performance in prior years 
(Shaw & Zhang, 2010). This can also assist in avoiding reverse causality between performance 
and compensation. We control for firm size (CHSIZE) as larger firms tend to have different pay-
performance relationships from smaller firms (Schaefer, 1998; Baker & Hall, 2004). We include 
CEO tenure (TENURE) to control for the level of experience of the CEO (Lippert & Porter, 1997; 
Brick et al., 2012). We control for leverage (CHLEV) and the age of the firm (FIRMAGE) as both 
are related to the investment opportunities, which in turn affect the pay sensitivity to shareholder 
wealth (Leone et al., 2006). We control for growth opportunities with book-to-market ratio 
(CHBM), following Cadman et al. (2010). We include long-term incentive pay (CHLTP) because 
long-term incentive plans can incentivize CEOs to focus on long-term goals which are correlated 
with NFPMs.10 We control for the level of institutional ownership ratio (INST) as institutional 
investors have a role in monitoring which impacts the pay-performance association (Hartzell & 
Starks, 2003). We further control for the SIC industry membership (IND) and fiscal year (FY). 
 
10 ExecuComp changed its definition of long-term incentive pay and total compensation in 2006 to reflect the SEC’s 
new reporting rules (Donahue, 2008; Gabaix et al., 2014). Prior to the new rules, investors were not able to calculate 
the accurate amount of total executive compensation due to the lack of information on components like option values. 
Thus, the total pay amount could not be compared across multiple years for the same firm or across different firms. 
Under the new rules, the summary executive compensation table in the definitive proxy statement should include the 
components of executive pay such as salary, bonus, option, pension and other compensation such that the aggregate 
dollar amount of the components is presented as the total compensation amount in the table. Therefore, we measure 




We next test the overall impact of NFPMs on pay-performance sensitivity with the 
following model: 
𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐴𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽7𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐻𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽9𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽11𝐶𝐻𝐵𝑀 +
𝛽12𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽13𝐶𝐻𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑃 + 𝛽14𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘 + ∑ 𝐹𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀,         (2)    
 
where NFPM= an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if the CEO incentive contract 
uses non-financial performance measures as well as financial measures and 
0 otherwise. 
                                                                                
Our main variable of interest is the interaction term, NFPM*TSR. A positive and significant 
coefficient 3 means that NFPM firms have higher pay sensitivity to shareholder wealth than FPM 
firms. This is consistent with our expectation of Hypothesis 1. We include an accounting 
performance measure, return on assets (CHROA), and its interaction term with NFPM 
(NFPM*CHROA), to control for short-term financial performance. In addition to the control 
variables discussed above, we control for the effect of a minimum financial target (MINFIN). Some 
NFPM firms limit bonus pay based on non-financial measures unless a minimum financial target 
level is met; therefore, it may limit the beneficial effect of non-financial measures.  
To further investigate the impact of different types of non-financial measures, we run the 
following model: 
𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐴𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝑆𝐹 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝐼𝐺 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝑂𝐸 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝐸𝑆𝐺 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑆𝑅 +
 𝛽6𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝑆𝐹 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽7𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝐼𝐺 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽8𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑁𝑂𝐸 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑅 +  𝛽9𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝐸𝑆𝐺 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑅 +
𝛽10𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽11𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝑆𝐹 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽12𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝐼𝐺 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽13𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝑂𝐸 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 +
𝛽14𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝐸𝑆𝐺 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 +  𝛽15𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽16𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽17𝐶𝐻𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽18𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 +
𝛽19𝐶𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉 +  𝛽20𝐶𝐻𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽21𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽22𝐶𝐻𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑃 + 𝛽23𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘 + ∑ 𝐹𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀                                                                            
(3) 
 
In Equation (3), we replace NFPM in Equation (2) by the four types of non-financial measures: 





11  We interact them with shareholder wealth (TSR) and accounting performance 
(CHROA) to test CEO pay sensitivity to those performance measures for the alternative types of 
non-financial measures. Positive coefficients of the interaction terms with TSR (6, 7, 8, and 9,) 
would indicate the use of those non-financial measures enhances CEO pay sensitivity to 
shareholder wealth. The variables are defined in the appendix. 
Hypothesis 2 expects that the impact of non-financial measures on pay-performance 
sensitivity increases as they are weighed relatively more in incentive contracts. We divide our 
NFPM observations with non-missing actual weights on non-financial measures into two groups 
based on the magnitude of weights: firms that place low weights (i.e., less than or equal to median, 
30 percent) on non-financial measures and those with high weights (greater than median, 30 
percent). For Hypothesis 2, we run the following model using our FPM observations and NFPM 
observations with non-missing values of contractual weights on non-financial measures: 
𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐴𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑊𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽5𝐻𝑊𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗
𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽7𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽8𝐻𝑊𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀,           (4)   
 
where HWNFPM is set as 1 if the contractual weight on non-financial measures of the NFPM firm 
is greater than the median weight of 30 percent, and zero otherwise.12 Controls are the same as in 
Equation (2). Hypothesis 2 would be supported if the coefficient (β5) of WNFPM*NFPM*TSR is 
significantly positive, suggesting that the coefficient of NFPM*TSR is greater for NFPM firms 
with higher weight than NFPM firms with lower weight.    
Hypothesis 3 tests the implications of financial risk on our results. We divide our sample 
into two groups based on two measures of financial risk - the standard deviation of annual return 
 
11 Including each factor in a separate regression or all together in one regression provides qualitatively similar results. 
We present results for the latter including all measures in one regression. 




on assets (ROA) and the standard deviation of annual returns (RET). We calculate ROA as income 
before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Annual returns are calculated as cumulative 
monthly returns over twelve months from the fourth month after the prior fiscal year end. We 
calculate the standard deviation of ROA and RET over the available number of years for each firm 
in our sample and require at least five observations, following Core et al. (1999). We divide our 
sample into high-risk group if the standard deviation of ROA (or RET) is equal to or above the 
median and low-risk group if below the median. We run the main model in Equation (2) for each 
group. Hypothesis 3 is supported if the positive coefficient (3) of NFPM*TSR is significantly 
greater for the high-risk group than the low-risk group. 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the industrial and temporal distribution of the final sample of NFPM and 
FPM firms. According to Panel A, our sample consists of observations from various industries. 
The highest number of observations in our sample belongs to the machinery and equipment 
industry which takes up 25 percent of the sample observations, followed by the wholesale and 
retail industry which is 15 percent of our sample. We find that research and development-intensive 
industries (such as chemical, petroleum, or telecommunications) and service industries (such as 
entertainment, transportation, or health care) tend to use non-financial measures relatively more 
often. For example, 53 percent of the chemical and petroleum industry observations (267 out of 
501 observations) use non-financial measures and 51 percent of transportation firms (95 out of 185 
observations) use non-financial measures. On the other hand, firms in the retail, machinery, 




processing) tend to use financial measures only. Around 80 percent of the wholesale and retail 
industry firms (478 out of 600 observations) and 63 percent of firms in the machinery and 
equipment industry (622 out of 984 observations) rely on financial measures only.  
The results for the time distribution of the sample are presented in Panel B of Table 2. The 
number of observations of NFPM firms has increased over time. In year 1994, 32 percent of the 
sample use NFPMs (58 out of 180 observations). It has steadily increased to a high of 41 percent 
in year 2009 (94 out of 228 observations).  
((Table 2)) 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for our test variables for NFPM and 
FPM firms separately. In terms of compensation, NFPM firms tend to have higher pay in the forms 
of bonus, cash pay and long-term incentives. The mean (median) BONUS is $1 Million ($637 
Thousand) for NFPM firms compared to $859 Thousand ($533 Thousand) for FPM firms. The 
mean (median) of long-term incentive pay (LTPAY) is $7 Million ($5 Million) for NFPM firms, 
compared to $5 Million ($3.5 Million) for FPM firms. These differences are significant at the 1 
percent level. The overall pay mixes for both groups of firms are similar with the mean bonus 
representing 11 percent of total pay ($1 Million÷$9 Million) in NFPM firms and 12 percent ($859 
Thousand÷$7 Million) in FPM firms. Long-term pay represents 75 percent of total pay ($7 
Million÷$9 Million) in NFPM firms compared to 78 percent ($5 Million÷$7 Million) in FPM 
firms. 
We find that NFPM firms, on average, have an increase in bonus in the sample period 
(mean CHBONUS = $5.52 Thousand) while FPM firms have a negatively skewed distribution of 
bonus changes (median CHBONUS = $0 and mean = -$28 Thousand). However, the mean and 




Median CHCASH is significantly higher in NFPM firms than FPM firms at the 10 percent level 
while the mean difference is not significant. Table 3 also shows that shareholder wealth (TSR) is 
significantly greater for NFPM firms (mean $1,784 Million) than for FPM firms (mean $1,091 
Million) at the 1 percent level. However, accounting performance is similar in both firms (mean 
CHROA is 0.19 in NFPM firms compared to 0.22 in FPM firms, and not significant). About 34 
percent of the observations of NFPM firms in our sample restrict incentive pay based on non-
financial measures unless the minimum target levels of financial performance are met (mean 
MINFIN = 0.34). NFPM firms tend to be larger than FPM firms (mean SIZE = 8.99 in NFPM 
firms and 8.56 in FPM firms, significantly different at the 1 percent level). CEO tenure is 
significantly smaller for NFPM firms (mean 7 years) than FPM firms (mean 8.5 years) at the 1 
percent level. The median firm age is 35 years for NFPMs and 33 years for FPMs and they are 
significantly different at the 1 percent level. Finally, institutional ownership tends to be higher in 
NFPM firms (mean INST = 0.60 in NFPM firms and 0.52 in FPM firms, significantly different at 
the 1 percent level). 
((Table 3)) 
In Panel B, we provide descriptive statistics across the four alternative types of non-
financial measures. We find that CEO bonus is the lowest when NFPMs rely on individual factors 
(mean Bonus is $990 Thousand compared to $1.4 Million if using operational efficiency). The 
mean value for CHBONUS is highest for the group of operational efficiency measures ($44 
Thousand), followed by that of strategic factors ($43 Thousand), that of individual goals ($9.11 





Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of our key variables. We find that the 
indicator variable, NFPM, is not significantly related to changes in pay variables, consistent with 
the moderate difference in the change in pay variables between NFPM and FPM firm groups in 
Table 3. However, NFPM is correlated with TSR, ROA, TENURE, and FIRMAGE. Specifically, 
older firms (FIRMAGE) with lower CEO tenure (TENURE) tend to use non-financial measures 
more (correlation coefficients = 0.056 and -0.090 between NFPM with FIRMAGE and TENURE, 
respectively). As expected, the correlation between CHBONUS and CHCASH is high (0.994, 
significant at the 1 percent level). There does not appear to be an issue with multi-collinearity in 
our tests. 
((Table 4)) 
4.2 Pay sensitivity to shareholder wealth 
We investigate whether there are significant differences in pay sensitivity between NFPM 
and FPM firms. Table 5 reports regression results of Equation (1) for CHBONUS (Panel A) and 
CHCASH (Panel B) for NFPM and FPM firms, separately. Prior studies report that CEO pay is 
significantly positively related to shareholder wealth (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Morgan & Poulsen, 
2001; Clementi & Cooley, 2010). We find that both bonus (CHBONUS) and cash pay (CHCASH) 
are significantly related to shareholder wealth (TSR) for both NFPM and FPM firms, consistent 
with prior studies. Specifically, Panel A of Table 5 shows that a $1,000 shareholder wealth increase 
is accompanied by an increase of $3 in CEO bonus for NFPM firms compared to a $1 increase for 
FPM firms.13 The result in Panel A of Table 5 is consistent with the notion that NFPM firms’ CEO 
bonus is more sensitive to shareholder wealth than that of FPM firms, rejecting the null Hypothesis 
 




1. Similarly, Panel B of Table 5 shows that a $1,000 shareholder wealth increase is associated with 
a $3 change in cash pay for NFPM firms and $1 change for FPM firms.14  
((Table 5)) 
We investigate whether the differences in pay sensitivity of the two groups reported in 
Table 5 are significant after considering various control variables. Panel A of Table 6 reports 
regression results of Equation (2) for CHBONUS and CHCASH using the NFPM indicator 
variable. For CHBONUS, the coefficient of NFPM*TSR is positive, 0.01, and significant at the 5 
percent level (t-statistic 2.17), indicating that the sensitivity of CEO bonus pay to current 
shareholder wealth is significantly greater for NFPM firms than for FPM firms. Since the 
coefficient of TSR is 0.01 (significant at the 1 percent level), NFPM firms have a significantly 
greater bonus pay sensitivity of 2 cents ($0.01 + $0.01) to a $1,000 increase in shareholder return 
than FPM firms ($0.01), even after considering our control variables. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is 
strongly supported in that NFPM firms enjoy enhanced pay sensitivity to shareholder wealth. Our 
result is consistent with the agency theory, suggesting that non-financial measures help firms better 
align CEO incentives with shareholder interests by increasing congruity of overall firm 
performance of both financial and non-financial measures.   
 ((Table 6)) 
As for control variables, CEO pay sensitivity to accounting performance, CHROA, is 
positive and significant, consistent with prior studies (Leone et al., 2006; Shaw & Zhang, 2010; 
Shim & Kim, 2015). The interaction term NFPM*CHROA is positive but insignificant (coefficient 
2.15, t-statistic 0.71). This result suggests that NFPMs are indicators of outcomes that shareholders 
value but are not captured by accounting performance measures. We also find that CHSIZE is 
 
14 In untabulated results, we find that including changes in long-term pay and stock options as control variables does 




significantly positively related to CHBONUS (coefficient 3.66, t-statistic 5.18). Changes in 
leverage, book to market and long-term pay are negatively related to CHBONUS (coefficient of 
CHLEV, CHBM and CHLTP -5.35, -4.07 and -6.83, respectively, all significant at the 1 percent 
level). We observe that increases in incentives provided in long-term pay (CHLTP) are met with 
decreases in bonus. The results for CHCASH are similar with a significant coefficient of 
NFPM*TSR of 0.01 (t-statistic 2.96) and an insignificant coefficient of NFPM*CHROA of 2.52. 
Overall, our result is consistent with the notion that NFPM firms signal to shareholders about 
incentivized CEO efforts on value-adding non-financial performance and better align CEO 
incentives with shareholder interests. 
In Panel B, we report the results of regression (2) including the four types of NFPM 
measures. We find that the coefficient on TSR is positive (0.01) and significant at the 1 percent 
level. The results show that pay-performance sensitivity improves for (1) individual goals with the 
coefficient of NFPMIG*TSR of 0.02 (significant at the 1 percent level) and (2) operational 
efficiency with the coefficient of NFPMOE*TSR of 0.02 (significant at the 5 percent level). We do 
not find a significant improvement on pay-performance sensitivity with the other two types of 
NFPMs - strategic factors (NFPMSF) or ESG (NFPMESG). Interestingly, the coefficient of the 
interaction term of ESG and accounting performance (NFPMESG*CHROA) is 8.30, significant at 
the 5 percent level. This result indicates that using ESG measures improves the link between 
accounting performance and CEO bonus while it does not have the positive impact on pay 
sensitivity on shareholder wealth. The overall results are similar when cash pay is used as the 
dependent variable.  
In summary, results in Table 6 support hypothesis 1. In particular, Panel B shows that the 




seems to be driven by measures of individual goals and operational efficiency. Measures of 
individual goals are mostly subjective and include those that evaluate CEO leadership, succession 
planning and CEO-specific individual achievements. Caranikas-Walker et al. (2008) find that 
subjective assessment of CEO performance is important, especially when a firm is heavily engaged 
in research and development, to offset the risk inherent in making bonus pay contingent on short-
term performance. Therefore, it is expected that measures of individual goals will align the 
managers’ interests with shareholders effectively. Bushman et al. (1996) also find that subjective 
individual performance evaluation is used more in firms with growth opportunities and higher 
product time horizon.  
Operational efficiency includes measures to assess manufacturing efficiency and cost 
reduction. These measures also may have better alignment with the long-term and therefore will 
lead to improvements in future performance and market returns. This is corroborated by findings 
in Baik et al. (2013) who show that operational efficiency changes are positively associated with 
changes in current and future profitability.  
The result of ESG is consistent with the notion that ESG measures are used more as a 
response to regulation and may not improve firm performance. Specifically, Alareeni and Hamdan 
(2020) find that environmental and corporate social responsibility disclosure is negatively 
associated with accounting performance.  
4.3 Contractual weights and pay sensitivity to shareholder wealth 
We identify 473 observations out of 1,483 NFPM firm-year observations where the firms 
have disclosed the actual contractual weights on non-financial measures in the proxy statements. 




percent and median weight is 30 percent.15 Thus, NFPM firms tend to place a significant weight 
on non-financial measures once they decide to use them. About 37 percent of the sample places 
non-financial weights of 20 - 29 percent. About 26 percent of the sample places non-financial 
weights of 30 - 39 percent. Furthermore, around 25 percent of the sample observations use 40 
percent or more of contractual weights on non-financial measures.  
((Table 7)) 
To test hypothesis 2, we separate NFPM firms into two groups: (1) firms that place weights 
greater than the median, 30 percent on non-financial measures (N=137) and (2) firms that place 
weights 30 percent or less on non-financial measures (N=336). We notate the first group with 
higher weights as HWNFPM=1 and the second group with lower weights as HWNFPM=0. Panel 
B of Table 7 presents descriptive statistics of key variables for the two weight groups of NFPM 
firms. We find that bonus pay (BONUS) is greater for firms with high weight (median $0.4 Million) 
than in firms with low weight (median $0.0 Million), significant at the 5 percent level. We find 
that cash pay (CASH PAY) is slightly greater in firms with high weight (median $1.4 Million) than 
in firms with low weight (median $1.3 Million), but the difference is insignificant. Shareholder 
wealth (TSR) of NFPM firms with high weight (median $903 Million) is greater than that of NFPM 
firms with low weight (median $445 Million), but the difference is insignificant. Our results show 
that 35 percent of NFPM firms with lower weight require minimum financial performance targets 
(MINFIN=1), on average, while 25 percent of NFPM firms with high weight do. The difference is 
significant at the 5 percent level. After eliminating 1,010 NFPM firm-year observations with 
missing information of the relative weights placed on non-financial measures in the proxy 
statements, we run our main test of Equation (4). Table 8 presents the results.   
 





Table 8 shows that CEO pay is significantly related to TSR with coefficient of 0.01, 
significant at the 1 percent level. With CHBONUS as a dependent variable, the coefficient of 
HWNFPM*NFPM*TSR is significantly positive (0.08) at the 1 percent level. This result indicates 
that NFPM firms with high contractual weights have a significantly greater bonus pay sensitivity 
to shareholder wealth than NFPM firms with low weights or FPM firms, supporting hypothesis 2.  
We find similar results for cash pay (CHCASH) with a significantly positive coefficient of 
HWNFPM*NFPM*TSR (0.08) significant at the 1 percent level. Interestingly, the coefficient of 
NFPM*TSR is significantly negative in both columns, suggesting that NFPM with low contractual 
weights have lower pay-performance sensitivity than FPM firms. However, caution is needed for 
generalization of this result because our sample size with non-missing weight values among NFPM 
firms is limited. Overall, our results support hypothesis 2. The results suggest that, as the 
contractual weight on non-financial measures increases, CEO pay sensitivity to shareholder wealth 
tends to increase. These results are consistent with the agency theory predicting that the intensified 
managerial effort for non-financial performance from the higher contractual weights has a positive 
impact on CEO pay-performance sensitivity to a greater extent as the weights increase. 
4.4 Financial risk and pay sensitivity to shareholder wealth 
In this section, we investigate how financial risk affects our results considering that high 
financial risk would increase uncertainty and noise of financial measures. We divide our sample 
into low-risk and high-risk groups using the median values of the standard deviation of ROA or 
annual stock returns, RET, and run our main model in Equation (2) for low-risk and high-risk 
groups separately. We present the results in Table 9 for CHBONUS only because the results with 




deviation of ROA greater than its median value has a significantly positive coefficient of 
NFPM*TSR (0.01), at the 5 percent level. However, for the low-risk group with standard deviation 
of ROA lower than its median value, the pay sensitivity to shareholder wealth of NFPM firms is 
not significantly different from that of FPM firms. The difference of the results between the high-
risk and low-risk groups is significant at the 1 percent level with an F-statistic of 9.37.  
Panel B reports similar results with the risk groups divided by the standard deviation of 
annual returns (RET) above or below its median. The high-risk group has a significantly positive 
coefficient of the interaction term NFPM*TSR (0.01), at the 10 percent level. The low-risk group 
also has a significant coefficient for NFPM*TSR (0.01) at the 10 percent level. However, the high-
risk group has a significantly greater overall fit of the model than the low-risk group with F-statistic 
16.6, at the 1 percent level. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is strongly supported, consistent with the 
notion that including NFPMs in CEO incentive contracts enhances pay-performance sensitivity, 
especially if there is high financial risk.  
((Table 9)) 
5. Robustness Tests 
We present robustness tests to control for omitted variables and endogeneity, survivorship 
bias, and peer performance.  
5.1 Controlling for endogeneity and omitted variables  
We conduct two robustness tests to control for omitted variables and endogeneity. The first 
is to use a propensity-score matched sample. We match each NFPM firm-year observation with an 
FPM observation based on the propensity of using non-financial measures in incentive contracts. 





Prob(NFPM=1) = β0 + β1PROS + β2QUAL+ β3DIST + β4F_CORR + β5DCYCLE +        
                               6LCYCLE+ ε,         (5)   
 
where PROS = a factor representing the firm’s prospective business strategy, 
measured using factor analysis of the following variables: (1) the ratio 
of research and development to sales, (2) the market-to-book ratio, and 
(3) the ratio of employees to sales; 
 QUAL = an indicator variable for quality which takes on the value 1 if the firm 
has won or been a finalist of a quality award and 0 otherwise; 
 DIST = a factor representing financial distress, measured using the factor 
analysis of the following variables: (1) leverage ratio and (2) leverage 
ratio scaled by research and development; 
 F_CORR= the correlation between return on assets (ROA) and annualized 
monthly stock returns (RET) by firm; 
 DCYCLE= an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm is classified 
as having a long-term product development cycle (based on the 2-digit 
SIC code classification provided in Said et al., 2003, Table 3, p. 205) 
and 0 otherwise; 
 LCYCLE= an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm has a long-
term product life cycle (based on the 2-digit SIC code classification 
provided in Said et al., 2003, Table 3, p. 205) and 0 otherwise;  
 ε = an error term. 
  
We suppress firm and time subscripts for simplicity. The propensity score is the predicted 
probability estimated from the logit model in Equation (5). We include, PROS, a factor 
representing business strategy, which is estimated based on the factor analysis of the three 
variables: (1) the ratio of research and development to sales, (2) the market-to-book ratio, and (3) 
the ratio of employees to sales. We include PROS because firms with a business strategy of high-
performing prospectors or innovators are more likely to use NFPMs than defenders which follow 
 
16 Simcoe and Waguespack (2011) use a similar approach to control for omitted variables in a different context. They 
investigate whether author name status affects the article publication rate. They also investigate, given the signal of 
author name status, whether attention the author receives from the publication community has an impact on the 
publication rate. To control for the simultaneity issue due to author status signal, which may affect the test of attention, 
they run a logit regression of the propensity of publication on the indicator of author status signal. Using the logit 
model result, they remove the impact of author status signal from the publication rate before running the attention 
model. We use a logit model of the propensity of adopting non-financial performance measures to control for omitted 




a cost-leader orientation (Ittner et al., 1997; Said et al., 2003). Said et al. (2003) discuss that 
defender firms focus on operating efficiencies and cost-cutting whereas prospector firms, i.e., 
innovators, seek new products and initiatives that are unlikely to be captured by financial results. 
QUAL takes the value of 1 if a firm has won or been the finalist of a major quality award 
competition during the sample period. We also include DIST, a factor representing financial 
distress estimated based on the factor analysis of (1) leverage ratio and (2) leverage ratio scaled by 
research and development. Distressed firms are expected to rely more on short-term FPMs than 
NFPMs (Ittner et al. 1997; Said et al. 2003). We include F_CORR, the correlation between return 
on assets (ROA) and stock returns (RET), as a proxy for noise in the financial measures. This 
correlation is estimated for each firm with at least five-year observations of ROA and RET in our 
sample. Finally, we include DCYCLE and LCYCLE as proxies for the product development and 
life cycles, respectively. We follow the industry classification used in Said et al. (2003) to classify 
firms with long versus short product development and product life cycles. 
Using the propensity score from the logit model in Equation (5), we match each NFPM 
firm-year observation with an FPM observation with the closest propensity score within the same 
fiscal year and same two-digit SIC industry. We identify 807 observations of NFPM firms matched 
with 807 observations of FPM firms. We run our regression model (1) and (2) using the propensity 
score matched sample. Untabulated results show a positive and significant coefficient of the 
interaction term NFPM*TSR for both CHBONUS (0.02, significant at the 1 percent level) and 
CHCASH (0.02, significant at the 1 percent level) as a dependent variable. The results for 
Hypothesis 2 (untabulated) remain qualitatively unchanged when we use the propensity matched 
sample. 




used in Said et al. (2003), estimating the propensity of adopting NFPMs and their impact on pay-
performance sensitivity endogenously. The first stage model is based on model (4) and the second 
stage model is our main regression model of Equation (2). The second stage results (untabulated) 
are qualitatively the same as our main results. Overall, the main results do not appear to be driven 
by omitted variables or endogeneity issues.  
5.2 Controlling for survivorship bias 
Our data sample includes all firms on the S&P 500 index as of December 31, 2004 with 
available data over the years 1994-2010. While this procedure of selecting a set of firms on the 
S&P 500 index at a specific date and collecting data for these firms over the long-term is used by 
prior studies (Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; Uotila et al., 2009; Ibrahim & Lloyd, 2011), it may 
cause issues of survivorship bias. As in Anderson and Reeb (2003), we control for the survivorship 
bias over the sample period using a sub-sample of firms that are included on the S&P 500 index 
for the full period 1994-2010. Our main results continue to hold in this sample.  
5.3 Controlling for industry peer effect 
Finally, to control for the industry effect more directly, we use industry-adjusted pay 
measures (adjCHPAY) for our tests. We calculate adjCHPAY as the pay variables (CHPAY) less 
the industry median in each fiscal year. We also use in our regressions an industry-adjusted 
performance measure (adjTSR) measured as TSR less its industry median for each year. Our results 
(untabulated) remain qualitatively unchanged with the industry-adjusted variables. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine CEO pay sensitivity to shareholder wealth in a sample of S&P 
500 firms over the period 1994-2010. Our focus is on investigating the differences between NFPM 




congruity between overall performance of the firm and shareholder wealth (Said et al., 2003) and 
serve as a better indicator of future financial performance (Ittner et al., 1997; Dikolli & Sedatole, 
2007). We find that NFPM firms have a better pay-performance relationship than FPM firms where 
performance is measured as shareholder wealth increases. This result is consistent with the notion 
that adopting NFPMs is a signal to shareholders that CEOs will place efforts on value-enhancing 
financial performance. This finding appears to be driven by the use of individual goals and 
operational efficiency measures. Furthermore, the use of ESG measures increases the pay-
performance association but only for accounting performance. In addition, we find that firms that 
use non-financial measures more heavily in their incentive contracts tend to have a better pay 
sensitivity to shareholder wealth than FPM firms. We also find that NFPM firms with higher 
financial risk show higher pay-performance sensitivity than FPM firms. Our results are robust 
throughout various sensitivity tests.  
This paper is important to investors and regulators as well as academicians in that it shows 
that the use of NFPMs can help firms improve the much-criticized pay-without-performance or 
low pay-performance sensitivities. Furthermore, it sheds light on the significance of non-financial 
performance in the shareholders’ investment decisions. This study has some limitations common 
in studies with hand-collected data. First, since the sample is based on large firms, the results 
should be used with caution to generalize them to other settings. Second, Core et al. (1999) report 
that firms with weaker governance structures have greater agency problems and receive greater. 
While we control for some governance aspects such as CEO tenure, we do not control for board 





Appendix A. Definition of Variables (in alphabetical order) 
 
BONUS CEO’s bonus in the current year in Thousands of Dollars; from ExecuComp; 
CASH PAY CEO’s cash pay measured as salary plus bonus in the current year in Thousands of 
Dollars; from ExecuComp; 
CHBM change in the book to market percentage from prior year to current year; where book 
to market percentage is measured as total shareholders’ equity, divided by the market 
value of equity (closing price multiplied by common shares outstanding), multiplied 
by 100; from Compustat; 
CHBONUS change in CEO’s bonus from prior year to current year; 
CHCASH change in CEO’s cash pay from prior year to current year; 
CHLEV change in leverage percentage from prior year to current year; where leverage 
percentage is measured as long-term debt divided by total assets at end of year, 
multiplied by 100; from Compustat; 
CHLTP change in CEO’s long-term pay in percentage, measured as the difference between 
long-term pay in the current year and the prior year, multiplied by 100; 
CHROA change in return on assets percentage from prior year to current year, measured as net 
income divided by total assets at beginning of year multiplied by 100; both from 
Compustat; 
CHSIZE change in size from prior year to current year, multiplied by 100; 
FIRMAGE difference in years between the year of the observation and the first year the firm 
appeared on Compustat; 
FPM an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if CEO incentive contract uses financial 
performance measures only and 0 otherwise; 
HWNFPM an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if the NFPM firm has contractual weights 
on non-financial measures greater than the median weight 30 percent and 0 otherwise; 
INST institutional ownership ratio calculated as institutional ownership level divided by total 
shares outstanding at year end where institutional ownership level is the sum of all 
shares for each firm held by institutions each year. We collect information on the 
number of shares of equity holdings by institutions which file 13F reports from 
Thomson Reuters; 
Lag CHROA change in return on assets percentage from two years ago to prior year, measured as 
net income divided by total assets at beginning of year multiplied by 100; both from 
Compustat; 
LT PAY CEO’s long-term pay in the current year in Thousands of Dollars, measured as the sum 
of restricted stock grants, long-term incentive plan payouts, and options granted in 
years before year 2006, measured as the sum of the value of non-equity incentive plan 
payouts, fair value of options granted, and fair value of stock awarded under plan-based 
awards in and after year 2006; all from ExecuComp; 
MINFIN an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm has a minimum financial 
threshold for any bonus payment and 0 otherwise; 
NFPM an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if CEO incentive contract uses non-







NFPMESG an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if CEO incentive contract uses non-
financial performance measures related to environmental, social and governance 
factors as well as financial measures and 0 otherwise; 
NFPMIG an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if CEO incentive contract uses non-
financial performance measures related to individual CEO goals as well as financial 
measures and 0 otherwise; 
NFPMOE an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if CEO incentive contract uses non-
financial performance measures related to operational efficiency as well as financial 
measures and 0 otherwise; 
NFPMSF an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if CEO incentive contract uses non-
financial performance measures related to strategic factors as well as financial 
measures and 0 otherwise; 
RET cumulated monthly returns over twelve month from the fourth month after the prior 
fiscal year end; from CRSP; 
SIZE log of total assets for current year; from Compustat; 
TENURE number of years the CEO has been in office; from ExecuComp; 
TOTAL PAY CEO’s total pay in the current year measured as sum of bonus, salary and long-term 
pay; from ExecuComp; 
TSR total shareholder returns or the change in shareholders’ wealth, measured as annualized 
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Total sample of S&P 500 firms, excluding financial and utilities firms over 
years 1994-2010 6,080 
    Less: Annual reports not found (e.g. mergers/acquisitions/bankruptcy)    (841) 
    Less: No CEO incentive contract disclosed or incentive plan not based on  
             performance measures    (195) 
    Less: Unclear information of performance measures in CEO bonus plan (18) 
Observations with non-missing NFPM dummy variable 5,026 
    Less: Missing financial data on Compustat  (382) 
    Less: Missing stock return data on CRSP (52) 
    Less: Missing compensation data on ExecuComp (108) 
Observations with non-missing test variables 4,484 
    Less: Observations with CEO change from the previous year (551) 
Final Sample 3,933 
Use only financials (FPM firms)  2,450  
Use both financials and non-financials (NFPM firms) 1,483 
    Less: NFPM firms with missing weights (1,010) 
Observations for the NFPM weights 2,923 
Use both financials and non-financials with weights (NFPM firms) 473 






Table 2: Industrial and temporal distribution   
Panel A: Industrial distribution  
  All firms NFPM firms    FPM firms 
Industry N (1) % N (2) (2)/(1) N (3) (3)/(1) 
(1) Natural resources 51 1.30% 27 52.94% 24 47.06% 
(2) Construction and metal 287 7.30% 76 26.48% 211 73.52% 
(3) Food 232 5.90% 92 39.66% 140 60.34% 
(4) Consumer goods 124 3.15% 13 10.48% 111 89.52% 
(5) Paper and printing 247 6.28% 135 54.66% 112 45.34% 
(6) Chemical and petroleum 501 12.74% 267 53.29% 234 46.71% 
(7) Machinery and equipment 984 25.02% 362 36.79% 622 63.21% 
(8) Transportation-related 185 4.70% 95 51.35% 90 48.65% 
(9) Telecommunications and cable  155 3.94% 82 52.90% 73 47.10% 
(10) Wholesale and retail 600 15.26% 122 20.33% 478 79.67% 
(11) Entertainment 15 0.38% 11 73.33% 4 26.67% 
(12) Business services 387 9.84% 120 31.01% 267 68.99% 
(13) Health and other services 150 3.81% 66 44.00% 84 56.00% 
(14) Unclassified 15 0.38% 15 100.00% 0 0.00% 
Total 3,933 100.00% 1,483 37.71% 2,450 62.29% 
 
 
Panel B: Temporal distribution  
  All firms NFPM firms FPM firms 
Year N (1) % N (2) (2)/(1) N (3)  (3)/(1) 
1994 180 4.58% 58 32.22% 122 67.78% 
1995 196 4.98% 64 32.65% 132 67.35% 
1996 217 5.52% 69 31.80% 148 68.20% 
1997 222 5.64% 81 36.49% 141 63.51% 
1998 234 5.95% 84 35.90% 150 64.10% 
1999 248 6.31% 91 36.69% 157 63.31% 
2000 234 5.95% 91 38.89% 143 61.11% 
2001 238 6.05% 90 37.82% 148 62.18% 
2002 267 6.79% 103 38.58% 164 61.42% 
2003 261 6.64% 105 40.23% 156 59.77% 
2004 263 6.69% 100 38.02% 163 61.98% 
2005 237 6.03% 93 39.24% 144 60.76% 
2006 241 6.13% 91 37.76% 150 62.24% 
2007 218 5.54% 85 38.99% 133 61.01% 
2008 225 5.72% 93 41.33% 132 58.67% 
2009 228 5.80% 94 41.23% 134 58.77% 
2010 224 5.70% 91 40.63% 133 59.38% 
Total 3,933 100.00% 1,483 37.71% 2,450 62.29% 
Panel A provides industry composition of the sample. The industries are classified based on two-digit SIC codes as 
follows: (1) 0-9,10-14; (2) 15-19, 30, 32-34; (3) 20-21; (4) 22-23, 25, 31, 39; (5) 24, 26-27; (6) 28-29; (7) 35-36, 38; 




Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Full sample (N=3,933) 
  
  NFPM firms (N=1,483) FPM firms (N=2,450) Difference 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean   Median  
BONUS  1,002.21 637.04 1,223.30 859.33 532.59 1,079.61 142.88 *** 104.45 *** 
CASH PAY  2,006.25 1,550.00 1,406.44 1,763.28 1,380.39 1,186.50 242.97 *** 169.61 *** 
LT PAY  6,964.54 4,969.28 6,575.66 5,256.47 3,446.45 5,762.45 1,708.07 *** 1,522.83 *** 
TOTAL PAY  8,970.80 7,079.42 7,069.48 7,019.75 5,172.32 6,173.59 1,951.05 *** 1,907.10 *** 
CHBONUS 5.51 0.00 897.60 -27.76 0.00 933.49 33.28  0.00  
CHCASH 62.20 74.17 911.85 20.96 56.73 942.34 41.24  17.44 * 
SIZE 8.99 9.03 1.25 8.56 8.49 1.11 0.43 *** 0.54 *** 
TSR  1,784.02 693.18 6,502.64 1,090.86 508.89 4,860.82 693.16 *** 184.29 *** 
CHROA  0.19 0.24 9.17 0.22 0.21 11.00 -0.02  0.03  
Lag CHROA 6.11 6.45 8.95 6.52 7.59 14.79 -0.41  -0.76 *** 
MINFIN 0.34 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 *** 0.00 *** 
CHSIZE 9.61 6.39 20.30 9.90 7.35 22.45 -0.29  -0.96 ** 
TENURE 7.17 6.00 5.52 8.50 6.00 7.04 -1.33 *** 0.00 *** 
CHBM 0.12 -0.05 16.92 0.39 0.09 18.96 -0.27  -0.14  
CHLEV 0.15 -0.08 6.49 0.37 -0.04 6.69 -0.22  -0.04  
FIRMAGE 35.21 39.00 17.54 33.25 35.00 16.33 1.95 *** 4.00 *** 
CHLTP  1.56 0.02 27.90 1.96 0.19 30.33 -0.40   -0.18   
INST 0.60 0.67 0.29 0.52 0.65 0.34 0.08 *** 0.02 *** 
*, **, *** represent two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using t-test for difference in means and Wilcoxon two-sample test for 

























(N = 680) 
INDIVIDUAL 
FACTORS  
N = 721 
OPERATIONAL 
EFFICIENCY  
(N = 172) 
ESG  
(N = 585) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
BONUS  1,081.26 730.94 990.28 616.40 1,481.08 942.35 1,143.28 800.00 
CASH PAY  2,061.96 1,637.18 1,983.16 1,532.57 2,624.12 1,950.00 2,225.53 1,778.10 
LT PAY  6,820.52 4,709.12 7,150.28 5,458.79 7,817.19 5,383.00 7,459.28 5,257.47 
TOTAL PAY  8,882.48 6,907.40 9,133.43 7,254.44 10,441.32 7,752.30 9,684.81 7,741.90 
CHBONUS 42.63 25.00 9.11 0.00 43.97 0.00 -9.06 0.00 
CHCASH 97.55 87.45 69.03 72.18 114.04 92.92 46.18 75.41 
SIZE 8.95 8.97 8.97 9.02 9.37 9.37 9.38 9.47 
TSR  1,622.94 716.90 1,881.38 661.23 2,350.11 1,012.62 2,354.51 852.88 
CHROA  0.11 0.23 0.07 0.25 0.57 -0.08 0.30 0.09 
Lag CHROA 6.54 6.99 6.56 6.63 5.02 5.17 5.39 6.13 
MINFIN 0.26 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.24 0.00 
CHSIZE 10.08 6.57 9.75 6.75 10.34 6.36 9.25 6.46 
TENURE 7.37 6.00 7.43 6.00 6.27 5.00 7.14 6.00 
CHBM 0.02 0.14 0.77 0.42 0.04 -0.35 0.53 -0.32 
CHLEV 0.60 -0.04 0.05 -0.11 -0.04 -0.06 0.37 0.00 
FIRMAGE 36.07 41.00 34.88 38.00 35.39 44.00 36.71 44.00 
CHLTP  1.69 0.11 2.14 0.15 -0.26 -0.18 1.67 0.27 




Table 4: Correlation coefficients of key variables (N=3,933) 
 
  CHBONUS CHCASH TSR CHROA 
Lag 
CHROA MINFIN CHSIZE TENURE CHLEV CHBM FIRMAGE CHLTP 
 
INST 
NFPM 0.018 0.021 0.061 -0.001 -0.016 0.489 -0.006 -0.099 -0.016 -0.007 0.056 -0.007 0.116 
 (0.272) (0.178) (0.000) (0.944) (0.329) (0.000) (0.687) (0.000) (0.310) (0.650) (0.000) (0.678) (0.000) 
CHBONUS 1.000 0.994 0.138 0.091 -0.058 -0.002 0.076 0.020 -0.046 -0.100 -0.027 -0.212 -0.003 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.878) (0.000) (0.204) (0.004) (0.000) (0.089) (0.000) (0.841) 
CHCASH  1.000 0.137 0.092 -0.057 0.001 0.082 0.006 -0.046 -0.094 -0.028 -0.215 -0.004 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.974) (0.000) (0.695) (0.004) (0.000) (0.081) (0.000) (0.818) 
TSR   1.000 0.077 0.063 0.019 0.141 0.018 -0.081 -0.292 0.050 0.049 -0.019 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.234) (0.000) (0.259) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.236) 
CHROA    1.000 -0.624 -0.015 -0.004 -0.013 -0.138 -0.048 -0.019 -0.020 -0.009 
     (0.000) (0.335) (0.784) (0.419) (0.000) (0.003) (0.238) (0.204) (0.586) 
Lag CHROA     1.000 0.005 0.209 0.082 0.023 0.088 0.027 0.049 -0.038 
      (0.762) (0.000) (0.000) (0.154) (0.000) (0.090) (0.002) (0.018) 
MINFIN      1.000 -0.009 -0.066 0.011 0.003 0.039 0.011 -0.012 
       (0.561) (0.000) (0.509) (0.861) (0.014) (0.500) (0.437) 
CHSIZE       1.000 0.064 0.099 0.103 -0.198 0.036 -0.039 
        (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.016) 
TENURE        1.000 -0.009 0.000 -0.105 0.007 -0.072 
         (0.588) (0.993) (0.000) (0.679) (0.000) 
CHLEV         1.000 -0.039 0.001 0.010 -0.017 
          (0.015) (0.948) (0.533) (0.278) 
CHBM          1.000 -0.018 -0.026 -0.034 
           (0.253) (0.109) (0.036) 
FIRMAGE           1.000 0.002 0.105 
                 (0.895) (0.000) 
CHLTP            1.000 0.008 
             (0.601) 




Table 5: Pay sensitivity to shareholder wealth for NFPM and FPM firms 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable = CHBONUS 
  NFPM  firms   FPM firms   
Variable  Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   
Intercept 0.18 0.00  -45.77 -0.79  
TSR 0.03 6.86 *** 0.01 2.62 *** 
CHROA 2.25 0.70  4.70 2.11 ** 
Lag CHROA -8.44 -2.54 *** -1.32 -0.77  
CHSIZE 3.04 2.61 *** 4.07 4.56 *** 
TENURE 3.78 0.95  2.13 0.81  
CHLEV -4.95 -1.40  -5.59 -2.01 ** 
CHBM -3.23 -2.32 ** -4.26 -4.14 *** 
FIRMAGE -0.12 -0.09  -1.10 -0.94  
CHLTP -9.10 -11.66 *** -5.63 -9.28 *** 
INST -42.15 -0.55  13.00 0.24  
Year Controlled   Controlled   
Industry Controlled   Controlled   











Panel B: Dependent variable = CHCASH 
  NFPM  firms   FPM firms     
Variable  Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   
Intercept 78.28 1.03  17.75 0.30  
TSR 0.03 6.99 *** 0.01 2.46 *** 
CHROA 2.93 0.90  4.88 2.18 ** 
Lag CHROA -8.18 -2.43 ** -1.16 -0.67  
CHSIZE 3.23 2.73 *** 4.35 4.84 *** 
TENURE 1.06 0.26  0.40 0.15  
CHLEV -4.60 -1.28  -5.85 -2.08 ** 
CHBM -2.89 -2.04 ** -4.13 -3.98 *** 
FIRMAGE -0.20 -0.15  -1.16 -0.99  
CHLTP -9.24 -11.65 *** -5.83 -9.53 *** 














N 1,483     2,450     
The table presents the regression results of Equation (1):    
𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐴𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐻𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽5𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐻𝐵𝑀 +
𝛽8𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐻𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑃 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘 +  ∑ 𝐹𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀,          
where CHPAY is either CHBONUS (Panel A) or CHCASH (Panel B). 
*, **, *** represent two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in 






Table 6: Tests of pay sensitivity to shareholder wealth  





























  CHBONUS   CHCASH   
Variable  Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   
Intercept -43.43 -0.93  23.40 0.50  
NFPM 7.80 0.23  10.69 0.31  
TSR 0.01 3.11 *** 0.01 2.96 *** 
NFPM*TSR 0.01 2.17 ** 0.01 2.38 ** 
CHROA 3.60 1.74 * 3.82 1.82 * 
NFPM*CHROA 2.15 0.71  2.52 0.83  
Lag CHROA -2.47 -1.66  -2.29 -1.52  
MINFIN -10.38 -0.21  -7.37 -0.15  
CHSIZE 3.66 5.18 *** 3.92 5.48 *** 
TENURE 2.51 1.15  0.50 0.23  
CHLEV -5.35 -2.45 *** -5.39 -2.44 *** 
CHBM -4.07 -4.93 *** -3.86 -4.63 *** 
FIRMAGE -0.70 -0.81  -0.77 -0.88  
CHLTP -6.83 -14.26 *** -7.01 -14.46 *** 
INST 1.17 0.03  -2.21 -0.05  
Year controlled   controlled   
Industry controlled   controlled   
       
R-square 8.63%   8.77%   




Panel B: Effect of use of different types of non-financial performance measures 
 
  CHBONUS   CHCASH   
Variable  Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   
Intercept -42.11 -0.91  24.04 0.51  
NFPMSF 60.51 1.47  60.82 1.46  
NFPMIG -9.78 -0.24  -1.98 -0.05  
NFPMOE -9.64 -0.12  2.10 0.03  
NFPMESG -38.02 -0.81  -41.85 -0.88  
TSR 0.01 3.49 *** 0.01 3.41 *** 
NFPMSF*TSR 0.01 1.14  0.01 1.15  
NFPMIG*TSR 0.02 2.76 *** 0.02 2.79 *** 
NFPMOE*TSR 0.02 2.05 ** 0.02 2.26 ** 
NFPMESG*TSR -0.01 -0.91  -0.01 -0.91  
CHROA 3.56 1.75 * 3.81 1.85 ** 
NFPMSF*CHROA -6.50 -1.53  -6.95 -1.61  
NFPMIG*CHROA 8.23 1.57  8.36 1.58  
NFPMOE*CHROA -9.66 -1.27  -9.65 -1.25  
NFPMESG*CHROA 8.30 1.97 ** 9.07 2.13 ** 
Lag CHROA -2.39 -1.60  -2.20 -1.46  
MINFIN 1.22 0.03  3.71 0.08  
CHSIZE 3.62 5.12 *** 3.87 5.42 *** 
TENURE 2.43 1.12  0.43 0.20  
CHLEV -5.50 -2.51 ** -5.56 -2.51 ** 
CHBM -4.12 -4.99 *** -3.93 -4.70 *** 
FIRMAGE -0.76 -0.88  -0.83 -0.95  
CHLTP -6.84 -14.29 *** -7.02 -14.50 *** 
INST -0.25 -0.01  -3.10 -0.07  
Year controlled   controlled   
Industry controlled   controlled   
       
R-square 9.07%   9.23%   
N 3,933     3,933     
Panel A presents the regression results of Equation (2):    
𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐴𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 +
𝛽7𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐻𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽9𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽11𝐶𝐻𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽12𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽13𝐶𝐻𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑃 + 𝛽14𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 +
∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘 +  ∑ 𝐹𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀,          
where CHPAY is either CHBONUS or CHCASH.  
Panel B presents the regression results of Equation (3):   
 𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐴𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝑆𝐹 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝐼𝐺 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝑂𝐸 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝐸𝑆𝐺 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑆𝑅 +  𝛽6𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝑆𝐹 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑅 +
𝛽7𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝐼𝐺 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽8𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑁𝑂𝐸 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑅 +  𝛽9𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝐸𝑆𝐺 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽11𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝑆𝐹 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 +
𝛽12𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝐼𝐺 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽13𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝑂𝐸 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽14𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀𝐸𝑆𝐺 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 +  𝛽15𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽16𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐼𝑁 +
𝛽17𝐶𝐻𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽18𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽19𝐶𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉 +  𝛽20𝐶𝐻𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽21𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽22𝐶𝐻𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑃 + 𝛽23𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘 +
∑ 𝐹𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀,                                                                             
where CHPAY is either CHBONUS or CHCASH. *, **, *** represent two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5% and 





Table 7: Descriptive statistics of contractual weights of non-financial measures 
Panel A: Distribution of contractual weights of non-financial measures in annual incentive plans 
 
NFPM weight N % 
1-9% 8 1.69% 
10-19% 49 10.36% 
20-29% 177 37.42% 
30-39% 121 25.58% 
40-49% 57 12.05% 
50% or more 61 12.90% 
Total 473 100.00% 
   
Mean NFPM weight    29.23% 
Median NFPM weight    30.00% 
Minimum NFPM weight  5.00% 





Panel B: Firm characteristics of NFPM firms with low versus high weights on non-financial measures 
     
 







(N=336) (2) Difference (1)-(2) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean  Median Std. Dev. Mean  Median  
BONUS  688.25 400.00 941.43 577.07 0.00 944.44 111.19  400.00 ** 
CASH PAY  1605.35 1397.82 1042.93 1620.41 1341.25 1008.69 -15.06  56.57  
LT PAY  6583.32 4524.31 6232.16 6440.80 4754.02 5801.88 142.52  -229.71  
TOTAL PAY  8188.67 5997.38 6795.15 8061.21 6394.78 6046.41 127.46  -397.40  
CHBONUS -122.93 0.00 940.94 -148.34 0.00 913.08 25.42  0.00  
CHCASH -79.60 62.50 946.81 -97.53 33.16 916.86 17.93  29.34  
SIZE 8.82 8.86 1.08 8.90 8.83 1.24 -0.08  0.02  
TSR  783.59 903.21 5253.92 758.98 445.31 5127.67 24.61  457.90  
CHROA  0.14 0.52 11.54 -0.21 0.01 5.62 0.35  0.52  
Lag CHROA 6.24 6.45 9.40 6.21 5.89 5.76 0.03  0.56  
MINFIN 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.35 0.00 0.48 -0.10 ** 0.00 ** 
CHSIZE 11.41 7.61 19.65 6.93 4.52 17.30 4.48 ** 3.09 *** 
TENURE 9.18 7.00 7.18 6.60 6.00 4.07 2.58 *** 1.00 *** 
CHBM 1.45 -0.11 17.89 0.60 0.40 17.54 0.85  -0.51  
CHLEV 1.05 0.00 6.19 0.43 -0.07 6.46 0.63  0.07  
FIRMAGE 29.26 30.00 15.97 39.48 44.00 16.74 -10.21 *** -14.00 *** 
CHLTP  2.34 0.39 23.95 3.86 0.19 25.36 -1.52   0.20   
INST 0.63 0.69 0.25 0.65 0.72 0.26 -0.02  -0.03  
The table provides descriptive statistics of NFPM firms with non-missing information of weights on non-financial performance measures. Panel B compares key 
firm characteristics of the NFPM firms with contractual weights on non-financial measures less than or equal to the median 30% (WNFPM=0, N=336) to those of 
the NFPM firms with weights greater than the median 30% (WNFPM=1, N=137). *, **, *** represent two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 




Table 8: Tests of pay sensitivity to shareholder wealth by NFPM weight  
   
  CHBONUS CHCASH 
  Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   
Intercept -46.73 -0.86  17.16 0.31  
NFPM -56.17 -0.90  -52.82 -0.84  
HWNFPM -78.01 -0.83  -84.63 -0.90  
TSR 0.01 2.73 *** 0.01 2.57 ** 
NFPM*TSR -0.03 -2.45 ** -0.02 -2.31 ** 
HWNFPM*NFPM*TSR 0.08 4.55 *** 0.08 4.52 *** 
CHROA 4.51 2.07 ** 4.74 2.15 ** 
NFPM*CHROA 0.83 0.09  2.08 0.23  
HWNFPM*NFPM*CHROA -2.68 -0.24  -3.77 -0.34  
Lag CHROA -1.42 -0.86  -1.22 -0.74  
MINFIN -13.60 -0.15  -24.43 -0.27  
CHSIZE 3.94 4.72 *** 4.18 4.98 *** 
TENURE 2.72 1.09  0.94 0.37  
CHLEV -6.61 -2.56 ** -6.73 -2.58 *** 
CHBM -4.18 -4.40 *** -4.05 -4.24 *** 
FIRMAGE -1.11 -1.05  -1.18 -1.11  
CHLTP -6.06 -10.69 *** -6.22 -10.88 *** 
INST 11.29 0.22  10.47 0.20  
Year controlled   controlled   
Industry controlled   controlled   
       
R-square 7.17%   7.26%   
N 2,923     2,923     
The table presents the regression results of Equation (4): 
𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐴𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑊𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽5𝐻𝑊𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑅 +
𝛽6𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽7𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽8𝐻𝑊𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀   
HWNFPM is set as 1 if the contractual weight on non-financial measures of the NFPM firm is greater than the 
median weight of 30% and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in the appendix. This model is estimated 







Table 9: Tests of pay sensitivity (CHBONUS) to shareholder wealth by financial risk 
 
Panel A: Risk based on the standard deviation (STD) of return on assets (ROA)  
 
Low-risk 
(STD of ROA < median) 
High-risk 
(STD of ROA ≥ median)  
Variable  Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   
Intercept 26.30 0.35  -47.88 -0.71  
NFPM 11.62 0.25  0.55 0.01  
TSR 0.01 1.31  0.01 2.60 *** 
NFPM*TSR 0.01 1.16  0.01 2.08 ** 
CHROA 23.52 2.84 *** 3.02 1.30  
NFPM*CHROA -9.45 -0.78  2.01 0.61  
Lag CHROA -10.52 -2.39 ** -2.15 -1.25  
MINFIN -40.60 -0.67  33.82 0.43  
CHSIZE 3.59 3.15 *** 3.48 3.66 *** 
TENURE 4.39 1.48  1.15 0.36  
CHLEV -1.04 -0.33  -6.30 -2.07 ** 
CHBM -8.00 -5.05 *** -2.73 -2.74 *** 
FIRMAGE -0.65 -0.55  -0.93 -0.71  
CHLTP -7.67 -11.72 *** -6.16 -8.85 *** 
INST -18.10 -0.30  9.43 0.15  
Year controlled   controlled   
Industry controlled   controlled   
       
F-statistic 9.37 ***     
R-square 10.37%   8.53%   











(STD of RET < median) 
High-risk  
(STD of RET ≥ median) 
Variable  Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   
Intercept 70.74 0.92  -82.04 -1.31  
NFPM 22.17 0.48  -8.41 -0.16  
TSR 0.00 0.30  0.02 3.30 *** 
NFPM*TSR 0.01 1.78 * 0.01 1.87 * 
CHROA 13.27 2.20 ** 3.35 1.42  
NFPM*CHROA -12.04 -1.59  3.06 0.87  
Lag CHROA -8.01 -2.22 ** -1.92 -1.10  
MINFIN -16.99 -0.27  3.90 0.05  
CHSIZE 4.86 3.98 *** 2.93 3.21 *** 
TENURE 3.26 0.97  2.08 0.71  
CHLEV -4.83 -1.49  -5.14 -1.71 * 
CHBM -12.22 -5.49 *** -2.70 -2.90 *** 
FIRMAGE -1.53 -1.19  -0.20 -0.15  
CHLTP -8.45 -11.82 *** -5.87 -9.06 *** 
INST -37.68 -0.54  20.76 0.35  
Year controlled   controlled   
Industry controlled   controlled   
       
F-statistic 16.61 ***     
R-square 10.02%   9.08%   
N 1,958     1,969     
The table presents the regression results of Equation (2):    
𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐴𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑀 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐴 +
𝛽7𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐻𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽9𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽11𝐶𝐻𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽12𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽13𝐶𝐻𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑃 + 𝛽14𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 +
∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘 +  ∑ 𝐹𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀        
All variables are defined in the appendix. The F-statistic compares the overall regression fit in the low-risk vs. high-
risk groups. *, **, *** represent two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
